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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of income inequality on economic growth in Italy during the 
period of 1967 to 2012. Specifically, using a technique that allows us to sort out long-run 
impacts from short-run impacts, we investigate whether income inequality benefits or harms 
growth, after controlling for human capital, labour, physical capital and inflation within an 
augmented growth model. Amid the existing debatable theoretical and empirical studies, our 
results suggest that income inequality has a negative and significant impact on growth in the 
long run. The negative impact of income inequality on growth still exist in the short run. 
However, the coefficient becomes insignificant. Overall, we gather that inequality hurts growth 
in the country. Based on this finding, we provide some policy implications.  
 
JEL Codes: D63; O15; O47; O52. 
Keywords: Income inequality; Economic Growth; Italy. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Does inequality benefit or hurt growth? This question has remained controversial both in the 
theoretical and the empirical literature. Theoretically, Kuznets (1955) argues that the relationship 
between inequality and growth depends on the stage of economic development. During the early 
stage, high inequality promotes growth, while at the later stage of development high inequality is 
associated with falling growth. The same argument is put forth in Barro (2000). The studies that 
followed Kuznets (1955) have leaned on either the negative or positive side of the inequality-
growth debate (see Mirrlees, 1971; Bourguignon, 1981; Venieris and Gupta, 1986; Rebelo, 1991; 
Galor and Zeira, 1993; Perotti, 1993; Persson and Tabellini 1994; Benhabib and Rustichini, 
1996; Piketty, 1997; Aghion et al., 1999). The empirical literature is equally divisive on the 
inequality-growth relationship (see, e.g. Barro, 2000; Sylwester, 2000; Easterly, 2001; Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2003; Castellò-Climent, 2010; Cingano, 2014; Ostry et al., 2014; Halter et al., 2014). 
 
The inequality-growth debate is clearly widely open for further probing. In this paper, we 
investigate whether inequality hurts or benefits growth in Italy during the period of 1967 to 2012. 
The Italian case is particularly interesting because the country has experienced rising income 
inequality during the past two decades or so. A quick look at some summary statistics will put 
the story in a proper perspective. The level of income inequality in Italy, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, was high during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. As the economy developed, the 
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level of inequality gradually improved from 0.38 in 1970 to 0.33 in 1980, and further to 0.29 in 
1990. However, inequality started to rise slowly since the 1990s. The Gini coefficient rose from 
its lowest level of 0.29 in 1990 to 0.33 in 2000, and further increased to 0.35 in 2012 (see 
Atkinson et al., 2016). The rising trend of income inequality is not unique to Italy. Many of the 
OECD countries such as France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
have also experienced similar rising trend since the mid-1980s. The main concern is that, unlike 
these peer countries, Italy’s income inequality is slightly above the OECD average. In 2013, Italy 
was ranked as the 13th highest in the level of income inequality among the OECD countries (see 
OECD, 2015).  
 
From this brief analysis, it is evident that the issue of inequality in Italy deserves much attention. 
Beginning with Brandolini (1999), different studies have covered various aspects of inequality in 
the country. Brandolini (1999) describes the sample surveys on the personal distribution of 
incomes conducted in post-war Italy by concluding that the country’s changes in income 
inequality can be classified into three episodes: stability or moderate decline between the early 
1950s and the late 1960s; sharp fall in the 1970s; and fluctuations around a flattened trend since 
the early 1980s. Manacorda (2004), using the Survey of Households’ Income and Wealth 
microdata, finds that the rise in inequality from the mid‐1980s was the result of the compression 
of differentials operated over the previous years by the Scala Mobile. De Vogli et al. (2005) find 
that income inequality had an independent and more powerful effect on life expectancy at birth 
than did per capita income and educational attainment in Italy. Ballarino et al. (2009), analysing 
inequalities in educational outcomes (IEO) by class of family of origin in Italy and Spain find 
that class IEO diminished in the two countries, and that differences in the timing of expansion 
and change in IEO can be accounted for through the different institutional settings of the two 
countries. Lilla and Staffolani (2009), analysing the evolution of inequality in yearly and daily 
wages between and within groups of blue and white collar using the INPS-ISFOL database, find 
that between-group inequality increased in the 1990s as clerical wages grew slowly, whereas 
blue collars’ wages remained nearly constant, and that within-group inequality increased only if 
measured by daily wages. Checchi and Peragine (2010) develop a new methodology for 
measuring opportunity inequality and for decomposing overall income inequality. Using this 
methodology, they find that inequality of opportunity accounts for about 20% of the overall 
income inequality in Italy, and that the South is characterized by a higher degree of opportunity 
inequality than the North, when population subgroups by gender is considered. Finally, Jappelli 
and Pistaferri (2010) find that income inequality is higher and has grown faster than consumption 
inequality in Italy. They also find that most of the increase in income inequality is earning-
related owing to earning instability rather than to shifts in the wage structure. Jappelli and 
Pistaferri (2010) attribute the rising income inequality in the country to the changes in labour 
market institutions such as the abolition of the wage indexation system, and the extensive market 
reforms during 1990s and 2000s. 
 
While the existing studies have explored the evolution of inequality and how inequality 
influences indicators such as health expectancy and social welfare, no study has analysed how 
the variable affects economic growth in Italy. This assertion is evident in the above studies. The 
studies that have analysed the inequality-growth relationship are based on cross-country and 
panel data, whereby Italy is included as one of the countries. It is therefore difficult to conclude 
that the findings of such studies will adequately represent the Italian experience. Hence, a 
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specific study on Italy regarding the inequality-growth nexus will add to the existing body of 
knowledge. Moreover, unlike countries with similar evolution in inequality, Italy has a longer 
time series data on income inequality suitable for analysing the inequality-growth nexus. Against 
this backdrop, we investigate the impact of income inequality on growth in Italy by employing a 
technique allowing us to distinguish long-run impacts from short-run impacts. As a preview of 
our results, we find income inequality to have a negative and significant impact on growth in the 
long run. This is also the case in the short run except that the coefficient becomes insignificant. 
These results suggest that inequality hurts growth in the country. We draw the implications of 
these results. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we review the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the inequality-growth debate. Then, in section 3, we present the 
methodology leading to the empirical results. Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Theoretical Relationship between Inequality and Growth 
 
In his pioneering work, Kuznets (1955) argues that the relationship between inequality and 
growth depends on the level of economic development. He shows that at the early stage of 
economic development, which involves a shift of labour and other resources from the 
agricultural to the industrial sectors, individuals experience a rise in per capita income. Such a 
change increases the overall level of income inequality in an economy. Hence, at this stage of 
economic development, the relationship between inequality and growth tends to be positive. As 
the economy continues to develop, more agricultural workers are able to join the industrial 
sector. At the same time, the decrease in labour supply in the agricultural sector drives up their 
wages. The combined effects cause income inequality to fall. This means that, as the economy 
develops, the relationship between inequality and growth becomes negative. Therefore, the 
overall relationship between inequality and growth can be described as an inverted-U (Kuznets, 
1955). That is, inequality first increases and later decreases as an economy develops (see Barro, 
2000). 
 
Following the pioneering work of Kuznets (1955), many theoretical studies have emerged, 
examining the macroeconomic links between income inequality and growth. Some of these 
studies argued for a negative relationship between income inequality and growth, while others 
contended that the two are positively related. In terms of the negative relationship, the imperfect-
credit-markets models demonstrated that the ability to borrow and lend is constrained by 
asymmetric information and imperfect legal institutions. With limited access to credit, the ability 
to invest mainly depends on individuals’ level of income and assets. Facing these constraints, the 
poor usually tend to forego the investment opportunities on human capital that offer relatively 
high rates of return. Therefore, a reduction in income inequality through the redistribution of 
income or assets from the rich to the poor tends to increase the amount and average return on 
investment, thereby increasing the rate of growth (see Galor and Zeira, 1993; Piketty, 1997; 
Barro, 2000). The support for this conclusion is found in political-economy models, which 
demonstrated that people tended to vote for redistribution of resources from the rich to the poor 
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if the mean income is higher than the median income in an economy. These models contended 
that higher income inequality tends to have more redistribution through the political process. 
Such redistribution may distort economic decisions, resulting in the decline in investment, 
thereby hindering growth (see Perotti, 1993; Persson and Tabellini 1994). The negative impact of 
income inequality on growth may still arise even if there is no income redistribution. This 
happens if the rich try to prevent redistribution policies through lobbying, which consumes 
resources and promote corruption in an economy (see Perotti, 1993; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; 
Benabou, 1996; Barro, 2000). From a socio-political perspective, inequality of wealth and 
income can lead to social and political unrest, as the poor are motivated to engage in crime and 
riots. The political stability may also be compromised by revolutions, casting greater uncertainty 
on expected duration of laws and orders. These disruptive activities not only directly lead to the 
wastage of resources, but also hinder investment due to the concern over the protection of 
property rights. In this sense, high income inequality tends to lower productivity and hence 
growth (see Venieris and Gupta, 1986; Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996; Barro, 2000). 
 
In contrast, other theoretical studies have demonstrated that income inequality is growth-
enhancing. The first argument is related to the saving rates. According to this view, the saving 
rates of the rich are higher than those of the poor. This implies that the aggregate level of saving 
will be lowered if there is a redistribution of resources from the rich to the poor. Hence, increases 
in income inequality enhance saving rates, leading to higher economic growth (see Bourguignon, 
1981; Aghion et al., 1999; Barro, 2000). The second argument is based on the investment 
indivisibility thesis. Some investment projects, such as setting up new industries or implementing 
new technology, involve huge setup costs. Owing to the huge setup costs, the concentration of 
asset ownership (i.e. higher inequality) is required to cover these costs to promote a new industry 
or technology. Therefore, high income inequality is critical in promoting growth, from this point 
of view (Aghion et al., 1999). Barro (2000) provided further support for this conclusion by 
showing that, in the imperfect-credit-market models, a positive effect of inequality on growth is 
possible if there are some setup costs associated with investment. He argued that increasing 
returns to investment only set in over some range of investment quality. For example, the returns 
to secondary schooling is superior to primary schooling in human capital investment (see Barro, 
1996). The former also requires huge capital investment than the latter. A reduction in inequality 
lowers investment in secondary schooling by enhancing primary schooling which does not 
improve the overall level of returns to investment, thereby hurting growth. The third argument is 
related to the trade-off between productive efficiency and equality based on incentive 
considerations. According to Mirrlees (1971), in a moral hazard setting, where output depends on 
the unobservable effort of labour, rewarding workers based on their observable output 
performance instead of paying constant wage will encourage them to improve their marginal 
productivity. Therefore, income inequality due to performance incentives is conducive for 
growth. The incentive argument is also modeled in an aggregate economy by Rebelo (1991). He 
demonstrated that redistribution by taxation reduces the returns to saving. This lowers the 
incentive to invest, thereby hindering growth. 
 
2.2. The Empirical Relationship between Inequality and Growth 
 
Accord with the theoretical ambiguity, the empirical findings on the relationship between income 
inequality and growth is also far from conclusive. These findings can be broadly classified into 
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three categories: (i) negative; (ii) positive; and (iii) inconclusive. Some empirical studies found 
inequality to exert a negative impact on growth. In this category, the earlier studies have used 
cross-sectional data to examine the inequality-growth association for a group of countries, 
including Italy. Such studies include Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), 
Clarke (1995), Birdsall et al. (1995), Perotti (1996), Tanninen (1999), Sylwester (2000), and 
Easterly (2001), among others. However, as Forbes (2000) pointed out, these cross-country 
studies failed to directly address the important policy question of how a change in the level of 
inequality within a given country will affect growth in that country. To address this issue, panel 
data has been used to specifically estimate how a change in a country’s level of inequality affects 
growth within that country. The studies following this approach are Banerjee and Duflo (2003), 
Castellò-Climent (2010), Cingano (2014), and Ostry et al. (2014), among others. Note that these 
studies also found a negative inequality-growth relationship. 
 
Although, most of the earlier studies have tended to document a trade-off between inequality and 
growth, recent studies have favoured a positive association between the two variables. These 
recent studies have mostly employed panel estimation methods to examine the inequality-growth 
linkage. The studies showing a positive association between inequality and growth include Li 
and Zou (1998), Deininger and Olinto (2000), Forbes (2000), and Halter et al. (2014), among 
others. Furthermore, there are studies documenting inconclusive results. For example, Birdsall 
and Londoño (1997) found that inequality has negative impact on growth, when other factors are 
excluded from the specification. However, the results become insignificant when income, land 
and human capital inequality are considered simultaneously. Similarly, Deininger and Squire 
(1998) also found a negative relationship between inequality and growth when regional dummies 
are controlled for. However, the results become insignificant when regional dummies are 
included in the estimation. Castellò and Domenéch (2002) also obtained a negative relationship 
when continental dummies are uncontrolled for. However, the results become insignificant when 
continental dummies are included in the regression. In addition, Barro (2000) found that the 
relationship between inequality and growth depends on the country’s level of economic 
development. The relationship is positive in rich countries and negative in poor countries. 
Similarly, Knowles (2005) found a negative relationship in poor countries but insignificant 
relationship in high and middle-income countries.  
 
From these empirical studies, it is clear that there is no general consensus on the relationship 
between income inequality and growth. The diverse and inconclusive empirical results reveal a 
number of limitations. First, many of the estimates of inequality on growth are not robust. When 
any forms of sensitivity analysis are performed, such as adding additional explanatory variables 
or regional dummies, the coefficient becomes insignificant (see, for example, Birdsall and 
Londoño, 1997; Deininger and Squire, 1998; Castellò and Domenéch, 2002). Second, data 
availability and quality is another issue. The constraint on the availability and quality of income 
distribution data across countries implies that inequality measures usually differ in terms of 
coverage, reference unit, and weighting of income. This may have affected the results of earlier 
studies which used heterogeneous national data (see Knowles, 2005; Cingano, 2014). Third, the 
coverage of countries is a limitation. The manner in which inequality affects growth depends on 
a country’s level of economic development. For example, the negative impacts of credit market 
imperfection and socio-political instability are likely to play a more important role in developing 
countries than developed countries (see Barro, 2000; Cingano, 2014). As a result, studies that 
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cover both developing and developed countries may capture an average effect, thereby giving 
misleading results (see, also, Barro, 2000; Knowles, 2005). Finally, measurement errors in 
inequality could generate positive or negative bias in the results, depending on how the errors 
related to the covariates in the specification (see Forbes, 2000).1  
 
Our study re-assesses the inequality-growth relationship by focusing on Italy, thus avoiding 
regional or country-specific factors that can compromise the empirical estimates. Rather than 
using alternative proxies of income inequality that are more likely to be prone to measurement 
errors, we employ the widely-accepted measure, namely the Gini coefficient. The data on this 
inequality measure is consistent because it is drawn from a single source. Moreover, since data 
on inequality measures for most countries is particularly short, the one used in this study is quite 
long – that is from 1967 to 2012. In statistical sense, this data may not be long enough. We make 
up for this limitation by using econometric techniques argued to perform well in small samples. 
Finally, unlike most studies, we employ standard variables that often appear in growth models, 
including human capital, labour, physical capital, and inflation. Therefore, our empirical 
estimates are based on a quite standard growth regression. In the next section, we present the 
methods and the data leading to our empirical results. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Empirical Specification 
 
This study follows studies such as Barro (2000), Castellò and Domenéch (2002), Banerjee and 
Duflo (2003), Castellò-Climent (2010), Cingano (2014), and Ostry et al. (2014), and specifies the 
following growth model featuring income inequality: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑡  + 𝛿4𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡  + 𝛿6𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡   + 𝜇𝑡           (1) 
     
where where 𝑌 is the aggregate output, 𝐻𝐶 is human capital, 𝐿 is labour, 𝐾 is capital, 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 is 
income inequaltiy, 𝐼𝑁𝐹 is inflation, 𝐷𝑈𝑀 is a dummy variable which captures structural breaks 
(taking values of zero and one, denoting no break and break, respectively), 𝛿𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, … ,6 are 
the shares of these inputs in the aggregate output, 𝛿0 is the constant term, 𝑡 denotes time, 𝑙𝑛 is 
the natural logarithm operator, and 𝜇𝑡 denotes the white-noise error term.  
 
The limitation of Eq. (1) is that it does not allow the policymaker to distinguish the short-run 
contribution of the factors to output from the long-run contribution. While growth policies are 
targeted toward achieving long-run results, production decisions take into account the short-run 
contribution of the factors of production. Therefore, by neglecting the short-run dynamics of the 
factors to the overall growth process, key insights are lost. Also, over a longer horizon, the 
determinants of growth may be non-stationary. Hence, estimating Eq. (2) results in spurious 
relationships. Towards this end, we re-specify the growth model to account for both short and 
long-run behaviour of the determinants. To do this, we employed the ARDL approach advanced 
by Pesaran et al. (2001). This approach is suitable because: First, it allows us to explore both the 
short and long-run relationships between growth and its determinants, including inequality; 
second, it does not impose the restrictive assumption that all the variables under study should be 
                                                 
1 This point is much related to the second point. 
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integrated of the same order – it is applicable to variables that are integrated of order zero, one, 
or a mixture of both; and third, it is robust in finite samples (Pesaran et al., 2001). The ARDL 
specification of Eq. (1) will take the form: 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + �𝜌2𝑖𝑞
𝑖=1
∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + �𝜌3𝑖𝑞
𝑖=0
∆𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐶𝑡−𝑖 + �𝜌4𝑖𝑞
𝑖=0
∆𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑡−𝑖 + �𝜌5𝑖𝑞
𝑖=0
∆𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑡−𝑖
+ �𝜌6𝑖𝑞
𝑖=0
∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + �𝜌7𝑖𝑞
𝑖=0
∆𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑡−1+  𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝜎5𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜎6𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−1+ 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                                                      (2) 
 
where 𝜀, 𝜌, and 𝜎 are the white-noise error term, the short-run coefficients, and the long-run 
coefficients of the model, respectively; and ∆ is the first-difference operator. 𝑡 denotes time 
period; 𝑞 is the maximum number of lags in the model to be selected by the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) or the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). The variables 𝑙𝑛𝑌, 𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐶, 𝑙𝑛𝐿, 𝑙𝑛𝐾, 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼, and 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹 are the natural logarithm of growth, human capital, labour, physical capital, 
income inequality, and inflation, respectively.  
 
It has been demonstrated in most growth models that the size of a country’s human capital stock 
is critical for its growth (Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1991). Therefore, a growth regression should 
contain human capital (Psacharopoulos, 1994; Barro, 2001). Besides, growth models have 
underscored the relevance of physical capital in economic growth (Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 
1992). Most fast-growing countries boast of a substantial stock of physical capital (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991). A higher inflation rate is not conducive for growth because it pushes up the 
cost of borrowing, leading to a fall in the rate of physical capital investment (Sarel, 1996; Barro, 
2003). Hence, these variables are justifiably included in our specifications. 
 
For the estimates of Eq. (2) to be reliable, the coefficients 𝜎1, 𝜎2, 𝜎3, 𝜎4, 𝜎5, and 𝜎6 must be 
jointly significant. In other words, the variables in Eq. (2) should be cointegrated for the results 
to be reliable. To verify the existence of cointegration, we test the hypothesis that 𝜎1 = 𝜎2 =
𝜎3 = 𝜎4 = 𝜎5 = 𝜎6 = 0. Pesaran et al. (2001) have derived two sets of critical values under this 
null hypothesis. The first set of critical values are derived by assuming that the variables in Eq. 
(2) are integrated of order zero, I(0), while the  second set are derived by assuming that they are 
integrated of order one, I(1). We can reject the presence of cointegration if the calculated F-
statistic is smaller than the first set of critical values. Similarly, we fail to reject the presence of 
cointegration if the calculated F-statistic is larger than the second set of critical values. The test is 
inconclusive if the calculated F-statistic lies in-between both sets of critical values. 
 
3.2. Data  
 
This study uses annual time series data covering the period 1967 to 2012. The time span is 
dictated by data availability. We sourced the data from Atkinson, Morelli, and Roser (2016), the 
Penn World Table version 9.0, and the World Development Indicators (2017) databases. In this 
study, we use: the log of GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) to measure output (Y), so that its 
first-difference measures economic growth; human capital index to measure human capital (HC); 
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population growth (annual percentage) to measure labour (L); capital stock at constant 2011 
national prices to measure physical capital (K); Gini coefficient to measure income inequality 
(GINI); and annual percentage change in consumer price index to measure inflation rate (INF). 
All the variables are in natural logarithm. Tables 1 and 2 show the description and justification of 
the variables, and their descriptive statistics, respectively.  
 
Table 1: Description and Justification of Variables. 
Variable Proxy Source Justifications 
 
Economic growth 
(Y) 
GDP per capita (constant 
2010 US$) 
WDI (2017) Arestis and Demetriades (1997), Temple 
and Wö𝛽mann (2006), Hartwig (2012)
  
Human capital 
(HC) 
 
Human capital index Penn World 
Table 9.0 
Li and Liu (2005), Mirestean and 
Tsangarides (2016) 
Labour (L) Population growth 
(annual percentage) 
WDI (2017) Temple and Wö𝛽mann (2006), Rajan and 
Zingales (2008), Moral-Benito (2012) 
 
Physical capital 
(K) 
Capital stock at constant 
2011 national prices 
 
Penn World 
Table 9.0 
Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
Income inequality 
(GINI) 
 
Gini coefficient Atkinson, 
Morelli, and 
Roser (2016) 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Deininger and 
Squire (1998), Barro (2000), Forbes (2000) 
 
 
inflation rate 
(INF) 
Annual percentage 
change in consumer price 
index 
WDI (2017) Sarel (1996), Barro (2003), Boyd et al. 
(2001) 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables. 
 Statistic lnY lnHC lnL lnK lnGINI lnINF 
 Mean 10.230 0.918 4.038 15.743 3.523 1.576 
 Median 10.327 0.932 4.043 15.836 3.511 1.562 
 Maximum 10.552 1.109 4.090 16.282 3.709 3.058 
 Minimum 9.622 0.702 3.961 14.809 3.378 -0.287 
 Std. Dev. 0.273 0.126 0.032 0.423 0.086 0.843 
 Skewness -0.630 -0.169 -0.554 -0.629 0.466 0.174 
 Kurtosis 2.170 1.762 3.063 2.364 2.759 2.101 
       Jarque-Bera 4.365 3.154 2.359 3.808 1.777 1.779 
 P-value 0.113 0.207 0.307 0.149 0.411 0.411 
       Sum 470.592 42.229 185.748 724.155 162.051 72.514 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 3.364 0.712 0.046 8.042 0.331 31.945 
       Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Note: Std. Dev. and Sum Sq. Dev. denote, respectively, the standard deviation and the sum of squared deviation. 
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4. Empirical Results  
 
4.1. Results of Stationarity Tests 
 
As a preliminary analysis, we first test the stationary properties of variables in the model. 
Macroeconomic time series, such as the ones used in the study may contain structural breaks. 
Domestic incidents2 such as the three episodes of recessions in Italy (i.e. 1981-83, 1992-93, 
2001-04), two major pension reforms (i.e. the Amato reform of 1992 and the Dini reform of 
1995), accession to the Eurozone in 1999, together with international developments such as the 
oil price shocks, the recent global financial crisis, the European sovereign debt crisis, may have 
generated shocks that could have distorted the paths of these variables, making an assumption of 
parameter constancy unrealistic. The presence of structural breaks has been found to distort the 
statistical power of unit root tests. According to Perron (1989), the standard unit root tests often 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit roots in the presence of structural breaks, even when 
there are clear indications of no unit roots. Since this discovery, some unit root tests have been 
developed to capture structural breaks in the underlying series. In this study, we utilize the 
Perron test developed by Perron (1997), and the Zivot-Andrews test developed by Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) to examine the stationarity properties of the underlying series. These tests are 
able to detect structural breaks in the transition parameter of the time series process. Table 3 
shows the results of the unit roots tests of the variables in their levels and at first differences. 
 
From these results, it is clear that 𝑙𝑛𝑌, 𝑙𝑛𝐿 𝑙𝑛𝐾, 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼,  and 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹 are stationary at their first 
differences. Looking at the results in Table 3, we may be convinced that lnHC is not stationary. 
However, the overall p-value reported under the Zivot-Andrews test suggest that this conclusion 
can be rejected at 10% or less.3 Moreover, there is no evidence in the literature suggesting that 
human capital is non-stationary after first difference. Therefore, having found that the variables 
are integrated of order zero or one, we then proceeded to test the evidence of long-run 
relationships between growth and its determinants by using the ARDL bounds testing procedure.  
 
Table 3: Results of Stationarity Tests with Structural Breaks.  
Perron Test  
 
Stationarity of all variables in levels Stationarity of all variables at first differences 
Variable No 
trend 
Lag Break 
date 
Trend Lag Break 
date 
No trend Lag Break 
date 
Trend Lag Break 
date 
lnY -0.278 2 2005 -2.549 2 2004 -6.973*** 0 1975 -7.146*** 0 2002 
lnHC -1.196 1 1980 -3.504 1 1994 -4.024 0 1990 -3.002 0 1984 
lnL -5.179* 2 1999 -3.078 2 1976 -6.583*** 4 1997 -3.156 4 1988 
lnK -2.821 4 2006 -2.821 4 1996 -4.167 3 1993 -5.343** 1 1984 
lnGINI -3.902 0 1974 -4.238 0 1984 -7.920*** 0 1982 -7.383*** 0 1994 
lnINF -2.845 0 1991 -4.350 0 1976 -8.427*** 0 1974 -8.582*** 0 1986 
 
 
Andrew-Zivot Test  
  Stationarity of all variables in levels Stationarity of all variables at first differences 
                                                 
2 For the macroeconomic conditions in Italy, the interested reader may refer to Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010).  
3 The p-values are not reported in order to keep the table clean. The data is available for replication purposes. 
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Variable No 
trend 
Lag Break 
date 
Trend Lag Break 
date 
No trend Lag Break 
date 
Trend Lag Break 
date 
lnY -0.104 2 2005 -2.031 2 2002 -6.530*** 1 1986 -6.736*** 1 2000 
lnHC -1.123 1 1981 -3.135 1 1988 -4.071 0 1991 -4.295 0 1991 
lnL -4.598* 3 1999 -4.015 3 1979 -6.376*** 4 1998 -3.522 4 1992 
lnK -2.370 4 2006 -4.467 4 2006 -5.088** 4 1981 -6.482*** 1 1981 
lnGINI -3.950 0 1975 -4.670 0 1980 -7.670*** 0 1983 -7.810*** 0 1983 
lnINF -2.899 0 1986 NA NA NA -8.439*** 0 1975 -8.358*** 0 1986 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote, respectively, 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance. NA denotes non-applicable. 
 
 
 
4.2. Results of the Cointegration Test  
 
The results of the ARDL bounds test for cointegration reported in Table 4 show that the 
calculated F-statistic of 17.942 is higher than the upper bound critical values reported by Pesaran 
et al. (2001) at 1% level of significance. Therefore, 𝑙𝑛𝑌, 𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐶, 𝑙𝑛𝐿, 𝑙𝑛𝐾, 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼, and 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹 are 
cointegrated. Hence, we proceeded to estimate the short and long-run coefficients and discuss 
their relevance.  
 
To do this, we first need to determine the optimal lag length used in the model by using AIC or 
the SIC. By restricting the maximum lag of the model to 3, we found that the preferred 
specification is ARDL(1, 0, 2, 3, 1, 3) for both the AIC and the SIC. Hence, the results obtained 
using these two criteria should be the same. Table 5 provides the resulting short and long-run 
estimates of the growth specification using these information criteria. 
 
 
Table 4: Results of the Cointegration Test. 
Dependent Variable F-statistic Lags Break Dates 
lnY 17.942*** 1, 0, 2, 3, 1, 3 1975,1986, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
2005 
    
    
k=5 Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
10% 2.26  3.35 
5% 2.62  3.79 
2.50% 2.96  4.18 
1% 3.41  4.68 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance level. Lags are based on automatic AIC. k is the number of regressors. Critical 
values for lower and upper bounds are from Table CI(iii) Case III: Unrestricted intercept and no trend of of Pesaran 
et al. (2001, p.300). Regression errors are OLS. 
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Table 5: The long and short-run results of the selected ARDL specification. 
Panel 1 
Long-run results: Dependent variable is lnY 
 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-statistics P-value 
lnHC -3.403*** 0.716 -4.755 0.000 
lnL -4.204*** 0.244 -17.246 0.000 
lnK 2.013*** 0.192 10.505 0.000 
lnGINI -0.129*** 0.042 -3.083 0.005 
lnINF -0.059*** 0.017 -3.592 0.001 
Constant -0.858*** 0.078 -10.941 0.000 
 
Panel 2 
Short-run results: Dependent variable is ∆lnY 
 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio P-value 
∆lnHC -3.668** 1.626 -2.256 0.033 
∆lnL -1.9948*** 2.965 -6.727 0.000 
∆lnL(-1) 2.2370*** 3.194 7.004 0.000 
∆lnK 5.203*** 0.425 12.257 0.000 
∆lnK(-1) -1.287*** 0.412 -3.120 0.004 
∆ lnK(-2) -0.742** 0.295 -2.519 0.018 
∆lnGINI -0.019 0.038 -0.497 0.623 
∆lnINF 0.000 0.004 0.054 0.957 
∆lnINF(-1) 0.036*** 0.006 6.266 0.000 
∆llnINF(2) 0.017*** 0.004 3.943 0.001 
ECM(-1) -0.975*** 0.095 -10.296 0.000 
Notes:  
(1) ** and *** denote 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
(2) Δ is the first difference operator. 
 
 
Panel 1 of Table 5 reports the long-run results of the growth determinants. We found that, in the 
long run, physical capital has positive and significant impact on growth, while human capital, 
labour, income inequality and inflation have negative and significant impacts. First, let us look at 
the impact of income inequality on growth. We found that income inequality has a negative and 
significant impact on growth. In the long run, a 1% increase in income inequality will hurt 
growth by nearly 0.13%. This negative impact of inequality on growth could be explained from 
the socio-political perspective (see Venieris and Gupta, 1986; Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996; 
Barro, 2000). In Italy, the incidence of poverty has increased markedly during the 2000s 
compared with peer countries. The country was ranked as the 5th highest in poverty compared 
with OECD countries in 2011 (OECD, 2011). In particular, young people aged between 18 and 
25 have faced higher poverty rate in Italy than the average in OECD countries (see OECD, 2011, 
2015). The rising poverty has led to rising income inequality in the country. That, combined with 
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the European sovereign debt crisis, increasing joblessness, industrial actions, and frequent public 
protests have hurt the country’s growth prospects. The negative relationship between inequality 
and growth has also been documented in other empirical studies including Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994), Clarke (1995), Birdsall et al. (1995), Perotti (1996), Banerjee and Duflo (2003), Castellò-
Climent (2010), and Ostry et al. (2014), among others. 
 
Considering the other growth determinants, we gather from the results that physical capital plays 
a positive and significant role in growth. In particular, a 1% increase in physical capital leads to a 
2.01% increase in growth, in the long run. This is in line with both the neoclassical and 
endogenous growth models, which argued that higher levels of investment increase productivity 
and hence the growth of an economy (see Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro, 2003; Moral-Benito, 2012; 
Mirestean and Tsangarides, 2016).  In addition, labour is found to have a negative and significant 
influence on growth. A 1% increase in labour hurts growth by about 4.2%, in the long run. The 
negative impact is due to the reason that higher population growth will lower the capital per 
capita, hence reducing the output per capita. This result is also documented in Moral-Benito 
(2012). In terms of the impact of inflation on growth, we found that it has a negative and 
significant impact on growth – although, the impact is mild. A 1% increase in inflation hinders 
growth by about 0.06%. Some studies (see, e.g., De Gregorio, 1993, 2006) suggested that higher 
inflation could increase the cost of capital, which in turn lowers capital accumulation, capital 
productivity, and economic growth. A similar empirical finding is documented in Aghion and 
Saint-Paul (1998), and Dotsey and Sarte (2000). Regarding the impact of human capital on 
growth, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we found that it has a negative and significant 
impact on growth. The negative impact is quite strong. A 1% increase human capital hinders 
growth by nearly 3.4%, in the long run. The negative impact of inequality on growth could be 
passed-through from human capital. This may be so because the recent evidence suggests that 
joblessness has increased in Italy during the last two decades, indicating that the funds 
channelled into developing human capital do not enhance growth. The young trained population 
do not have jobs to transfer their skills into productive purposes. This view may not entirely 
capture the Italian story. Hence, given this unique finding, further research on human capital and 
growth in this country should be conducted to shed more light. 
 
We now turn to Panel 2 of Table 5 for the short-run results. Similar to the long-run results, 
human capital also show a negative and significant impact on growth in the short run. In 
addition, income inequality also shows a negative impact on growth which is similar to the long-
run result, despite the fact that the coefficient is insignificant. The short-run coefficients of 
labour, capital and inflation, all show differential impacts on growth at different lags. Finally, the 
results show that the coefficient of the error-correction term, which measures the short-run 
dynamics and the adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium path, is negative and statistically 
significant. The results suggest that, when the variables drift apart from the equilibrium level in 
the short run, they adjust back in the next period at a rate of 0.98%.   
 
Overall, the selected ARDL specification is well-fitted with the adjusted R-squared equals 90%. 
Table 6 reports the diagnostic tests. The tests reveal that the estimates are free from serial 
correlation, heteroscedasticity, and functional misspecification. In addition, Figures A.1 and A.2 
in the Appendix show the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the cumulative 
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sum of squares of recursive residuals (CUSUMSQ) plots, respectively.  They show that the 
estimates reported above are structurally stable. Therefore, the results are reliably estimated. 
 
Table 6: Results of the diagnostic tests. 
Test Statistic P-value 
Serial Correlation: CHSQ(1) 
 
0.0004 
 
0.984 
Heteroscedasticity: CHSQ (1) 
 
0.045 
 
0.831 
 
Functional Form: F(1, 25) 
 
0.428 
 
0.519 
 
Normality: CHSQ (4) 7.117 0.130 
   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we investigated the impact of income inequality on growth in Italy during the 
period of 1967 to 2012. Specifically, we investigated whether income inequality hurts or benefits 
growth in the country after controlling for human capital, labour, physical capital and inflation. 
Using a technique permitting us to distinguish between long-run impacts and short-run impacts, 
we found that income inequality has a negative and significant impact on growth in the long run. 
In the short run, the negative impact of income inequality on growth still holds, despite the fact 
that the coefficient became insignificant. In addition, we found that physical capital plays a 
positive and significant role in growth, while labour, human capital and inflation inhibit growth, 
in the long run. These findings suggest that policymakers should pursue policies that reduce the 
level of income inequality. A comprehensive approach to tackling inequality should be adopted. 
According to Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010), the cause of rising level of income inequality in Italy 
is mainly due to the changes in labour market institutions. These changes led to an increase in the 
degree of earnings’ instability, thereby increasing the level of income inequality. Against this 
background, perhaps policies such as flexible working-hours arrangement and childcare support 
should be pursued to promote women participation in the labour market (see, also, OECD, 2015). 
In addition, other programmes to improve access to the public services such as high-quality 
education, on-the-job training, and healthcare, should be pursued (see, also, Cingano, 2014). On 
the one hand, these programmes constitute a long-term social investment, which will directly 
boost economic growth through increases in physical capital. On the other, these programmes 
will create greater equality of opportunities in the long run, which will be beneficial to long-run 
growth. Lastly, a better design of tax and benefit systems is needed to ensure an efficient 
redistribution to ease the needs of the lower income group, while minimising the distortionary 
effects of redistribution in the country. The implications drawn here are by no means exhaustive. 
Hence, further policy implications may be inferred from our findings. One way future studies 
could extend our results is by using microdata on inequality and firm level output. Although, this 
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will involve substantial cost in terms of data assortment and funding, evidence from such an 
extension will yield a more comprehensive picture on the inequality-growth relationship in Italy.     
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Appendix 
Figure A.1: Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals (CUSUM)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2: Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals (CUSUMSQ) 
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